Deny and deny and deny is the Saudi policy, when asked what assistance it gave to the anti-Assad Islamist rebels in Syria. Even when I found Bosnian weapons documents in a Nusrah base in Aleppo, signed off by an arms manufacturer near Sarajevo called Ifet Krnjic — and even when I tracked down Krnjic himself, who explained how the weapons had been sent to Saudi Arabia he even described the Saudi officials whom he spoke to in his factory — the Saudis denied the facts.
Yet today, almost incredibly, it seems the Saudis themselves are now contemplating an entirely new approach to Syria. Already their United Arab Emirates allies in the Yemeni war another Saudi catastrophe have reopened their embassy in Damascus: a highly significant decision by the Gulf state, although largely ignored in the west.
Now, it seems, the Saudis are thinking of strengthening their cooperation with Russia by financing, along with the Emiratis and perhaps also Kuwait, the reconstruction of Syria.
The Qataris, despite their Al-Jazeera worldwide empire, want to expand their power over real, physical land; and Syria is an obvious target for their generosity and wealth. But if the Saudis decided to take on this onerous role, the kingdom would at one and the same time muscle both Iran and Qatar aside. Or so it believes. But Saudi interest in Syria is not merely conjecture.
The Emirates might even negotiate between the Saudis and the Syrians. In other words, Syria — with Russian encouragement — is steadily resuming the role it maintained before the revolt. Given the deadlock on the Ukrainian crisis, an intervention in the Syrian conflict, which Western powers had been heavily involved in, presented the Russian government with another front where it could pressure the West into negotiations.
Less than a year later, Russian troops, along with Iranian-backed militias and Syrian government forces, laid siege on East Aleppo , and by November, forced opposition armed groups to surrender and leave the city. This was a turning point in the conflict, as it marked the steady retreat of opposition forces and ushered in a new axis between Russia, Iran and Turkey, seeking to resolve the Syrian crisis while excluding the West and Arab powers.
In January , the Astana now Nur-Sultan format was launched which brought together the Syrian opposition, including armed groups formerly supported by the West but by then largely abandoned, and the Syrian government, along with Russia, Iran and Turkey. Later that year, under this format, Russia managed to establish four de-escalation zones where all sides committed to pause military activities. This removed the burden of fighting on multiple fronts and allowed Syrian government forces, along with their Russian and Iranian allies, to take over one opposition-held area after the other.
Parts of Idlib province now form the last de-escalation zone remaining in opposition control. It forced Turkey to re-engage, following a crisis in relations caused by the downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkish forces, in The failed coup attempt against the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in , accelerated the process. This allowed Russia to enter into the Libyan fray, albeit late, and seek a say in the future of the country by backing the offensive of renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar on the capital Tripoli.
Despite the increased diplomatic engagement in the region and the prestige on the international scene that has come with it, Russia has not really achieved the same level of influence the US has had.
Moscow has also failed to leverage its position in the Syrian conflict to jump-start dialogue with the West on sanctions or even get Western Europe to commit to funding the reconstruction of war-ravaged Syria. At the same time, Russia is not in full control of Damascus. The regime is quite independent and is able to use both Moscow and Tehran to ensure its survival. So yes, there have been violations by the armed groups, and yes, they have also shelled civilian areas in Damascus.
But by looking at the abuses of only one side, you are missing the point: first, the general population in Eastern Ghouta — which suffers the most — is not fighting; two, the regime is killing on a massive scale. Shelling by rebels killed 64 civilians in February in the whole of Syria, while regime bombardment killed The regime, too, has arrested, forcibly disappeared, tortured and executed tens of thousands of people.
And the Russian accusations that the armed groups are holding civilians back as human shields sound all too familiar. The US, too, said the same about the nearly 1, people who lost their lives during the offensive on Raqqa. Rebel groups have killed civilians, and so has the regime — on a massive scale, too.
You cannot condemn the crimes of one side without condemning the crimes of the other and still think you are a proponent of justice. Loubna Mrie. Published On 4 Mar Loubna Mrie is a Syrian photojournalist and writer.
She has been covering the conflict in East Aleppo and Idlib and other parts of Syria. More from Author. Most Read. Throughout this period, family members have often held high posts in the government and military. Traditionally, the regime's staunchest supporters were the Alawites, the ethnic group of the ruling family.
Since the beginning of the conflict, Bashar al-Assad has consistently painted himself as a defender against domestic "terrorists", a term which the Syrian regime applies to essentially all their opponents in the conflict. This theme became even more prevalent with the rise of ISIS, as al-Assad has sought to establish himself as a "protector" of the Syrian people against the Islamic State. Another important factor in the survival of the Syrian regime has been the support of foreign patrons. The financial, military, and political support of the Russian and Iranian governments are a major reason that al-Assad's government has been able to maintain its hold on power.
Al-Assad, his government, and his Russian benefactors has been accused of committing war crimes in Syria.
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